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Abstract: At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the 
standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a cer-
tain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. The main rea-
sons for descriptivism are the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and 
improving communication in a situation of theoretical disagreement, and the 
Ignorance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative fail-
ure of the project of finding biomarkers for most mental disorders. Descrip-
tivism has also the advantage of capturing the phenomenology of mental dis-
orders, which appears to be essential for diagnosis, though not exhaustive of 
the nature of the disease. I argue that if we rely on the distinction between 
conceptions (procedures of identification) and concepts (reference-fixing 
representations), which was introduced in the philosophical debate on the 
nature of concepts, we may understand a limited but valid role for descrip-
tive characterizations, and reply to common objections addressed by those 
who advocate a theoretically informed approach to nosology.
Keywords: psychiatry, philosophy, classification, nosology, DSM, DSM-5, mental 
disorder, concept
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I
While mental disorders are highly prevalent in all regions of the world, 
and increasingly recognized as such by the public opinion in US and EU 
countries1, there is little agreement in the scientific community on how to 
classify them for research and diagnostic practice, as recent debates about 
 1 Zachary Steel et al., The global prevalence of common mental disorders: a systematic review 
and meta-analysis 1980–2013, “International journal of epidemiology”, XLIII, 2, 2014, pp. 476-481; 
Matthias C. Angermeyer et al., Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental illness: 
a review of population studies, “Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica”, CXIII, 3, 2006, pp. 163-179.
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the preparation and publication of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of mental Disorders (DSM-5)2 show3. One prominent 
critical issue among the others4, both philosophical and psychiatric in na-
ture, is the following: is the descriptive (symptom-based and criterial) char-
acterization employed in the DSM-5, as in the previous versions of DSM 
and ICD, still a viable approach, or would a theoretical approach be more 
adequate? Supporters of the theoretical approach argue that information 
about causes and mechanisms (at the genetic, neuropathological, or other 
level) ought to be integrated in the characterization of specific disorders5. 
A further claim from some of the supporters of this position is that such a 
process will inevitably result in an abandonment of most of the current 
categories and criteria in the DSM-5, as it is made explicit in the presenta-
 2 American Psychiatric Association et al., Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disor-
ders (DSM-5®), American Psychiatric Publications, Washington 2013. Mental disorders are also 
included in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), now under revision, with minor 
changes with respect to DSM-5 (World Health Organization, The ICD-10 classification of mental 
and behavioural disorders: clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, Geneva, World Health 
Organization, 1992). While other classification systems are actually employed in clinical settings, 
most research is conducted on the DSM-ICD categories, and so the philosophical and method-
ological debate on psychiatry focuses on them. (See also International Advisory Group for the 
revision of ICD-10 Mental and behavioural Disorders, A Conceptual Framework for the Revision 
of the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, “World Psychiatry”, X, 2, 2011, 
pp. 86–92). 
 3 Steeves Demazeux and Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in perspective: Philosophical reflec-
tions on the psychiatric Babel, Vol. 10, Springer Dordrecht 2015; Harold Kincaid and Jacqueline A. 
Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge (Mass.) 2014; rachel Cooper, Diagnosing the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental dis-
orders, Karnac books, London 2014; Peter Zachar et al. (eds.), Alternative perspectives on psychiat-
ric validation: DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond, OUP, Oxford 2014; James Phillips et al., The six most 
essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1: conceptual and definitional issues in 
psychiatric diagnosis, “Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine”, VII, 1, 2012, pp. 1-29; 
Kenneth S. Kendler, and Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Explanation, phe-
nomenology, and nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press, baltimore 2008, 2nd edition 2015.
 4 DSM-5 has also been criticized for hyper-pathologizing normal life, being the product of 
socioeconomic interests, not addressing the problem of comorbidity of mental disorders, and for 
endorsing an inadequate general definition of mental disorders. The literature on these issues 
vastly exceeds the limits of the present contribution. See r. Cooper, Diagnosing the diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders, cit. for references.
 5 Jonathan Y. Tsou, DSM-5 and psychiatry’s second revolution: Descriptive vs. theoretical ap-
proaches to psychiatric classification, in Steeves Demazeux and Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in 
Perspective, Springer Netherlands 2015, pp. 43-62; Dominic Murphy, Psychiatry in the scientific 
image, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2006; Steven E. Hyman, Can neuroscience be integrated into 
the DSM-V?, “Nature reviews Neuroscience”, VIII, 9, 2007, pp. 725-732 and Id., The diagnosis 
of mental disorders: the problem of reification, “Annual review of clinical psychology”, VI, 2010, 
pp. 155-179; Kathryn Tabb, Psychiatric progress and the assumption of diagnostic discrimination, 
“Philosophy of Science”, LXXXII, 5, 2015, pp. 1047-1058.
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tion of the research Domain Criteria (rDoC) project, a blueprint for a 
new system of classification6. On the other hand, arguments in favour of 
supporters of a descriptivist approach to psychiatric nosology point to the 
failures of the search for common causes and mechanisms for mental dis-
orders so far, and reaffirm that reliability of diagnoses, communication fa-
cilitation, and clinical utility are the main goals for the diagnostic manual7.
A bird’s eye view on the debate taking place in international journals 
and conferences seems to show that – sociologically speaking – descriptiv-
ism is the minority position, with a few psychiatrists and psychologists sup-
porting it, while most philosophers of psychiatry endorse a critical, theo-
retical perspective. In line with the minority, I shall argue in what follows 
that descriptivism is still a viable approach for the Diagnostic Manual to 
adopt. I shall maintain that what critics of descriptivism address with their 
critical remarks is not (in exemplar cases) descriptivism per se, but rather 
two possible shortcomings of this approach, namely, that constructs of spe-
cific disorders are poorly validated, and that criterial descriptions are often 
taken as definitory. Neither of those shortcomings, however, belongs to de-
scriptivism intrinsically. From the debate on mental content within analytic 
philosophy I resume a distinction, which can make this point clearer: that 
between concepts, representations of categories, and conceptions, specifica-
tions of how we identify and discriminate elements of such categories8. 
What makes something member of a category (expressed by a concept) 
should not be confused with how we usually and preferably recognize it as 
such (the conceptions); in philosophical terminology, metaphysics should 
not be confused with epistemology. Conceptions are rough-and-ready, var-
iable, and always fallible procedures of identification for members of a cat-
 6 David J. Kupfer and Darrell A. regier, Neuroscience, clinical evidence, and the future of 
psychiatric classification in DSM-5, “American Journal of Psychiatry”, CLXVIII, 7, 2011, pp. 672-
674; bruce N. Cuthbert and Thomas r. Insel, Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: the seven 
pillars of RDoC, “bMC medicine”, XI, 1, 2013, pp. 1-5; Scott O. Lilienfeld and Michael T. 
Treadway, Clashing Diagnostic Approaches: DSM-ICD Versus RDoC, “Annual review of clinical 
psychology, XII, 2016, pp. 435-463.
 7 Kenneth S. Kendler and Michael b. First, Alternative futures for the DSM revision process: 
iteration v. paradigm shift, “The british Journal of Psychiatry”, CXCVII, 4, 2010, pp. 263-265; 
Allen J. Frances and Thomas Widiger, Psychiatric diagnosis: lessons from the DSM-IV past and 
cautions for the DSM-5 future, “Annual review of Clinical Psychology”, VIII, 2012, pp. 109-130; 
Michael b. First, Clinical utility in the revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), “Professional Psychology: research and Practice”, XLI, 6, 2010, pp. 465-473.
 8 Georges rey, Concepts versus conceptions (again), “behavioral and brain Sciences”, XXX-
III, 2-3, 2010, pp. 221-222; John rawls, A Theory of Justice, belknap Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts 1999; Georges rey, Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips, “Cogni-
tion”, XIX, pp. 297-303, 1985.
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egory, and do not define the category’s extension; concepts do, and their 
complete characterization is the experts’ task9. Equipped with this philo-
sophical distinction, a viable option within the current debate on DSM-5 is 
that mental disorders correspond to theoretically informed concepts, possi-
bly representing natural or real kinds, some of which are yet to be fully dis-
covered, but they are also associated with (pro tempore) descriptive concep-
tions that enable identification practices in diagnosis and communication. 
Once a concept has been successfully validated, then which conceptions 
we might choose in order to apply it to everyday diagnostic and healthcare 
cases, will be largely a pragmatic option.
The position so outlined is a conciliatory one, based on acknowledging 
most of the reasons of both the theoretic and the descriptivist fronts. It is 
also a minimalist position with respect to the role of DSM-5, for on this 
view, an instrument such as DSM-5 should not be expected to explain 
what mental disorders are, but rather to establish itself as a most efficient 
tool for diagnosis and for improving communication within the scientific 
community, as well as inter- and intra-personal reliability10. Other scientif-
ic instruments may be apt for explaining what each mental disorder is, 
such as the forthcoming rdoC11, thereby opening up the possibility of 
two or more levels of classification, the diagnostic-oriented one, and the 
research-based one(s), to be employed in constant reciprocal feedback.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the descriptive 
stance of DSM, from the third to the latest edition, is briefly recapitulat-
ed, along with the main reasons for it, namely reliability and communica-
tion facilitation, and what I shall call the ignorance argument. In the third 
and longest part of the paper I illustrate the distinction between the no-
tions of concept and conception, and I show how it brings to bear on 
what I take to be the three main criticisms raised against the descriptive 
approach: its alleged distance from the medical model, the poor validity 
of existing nosological categories, and the problem of their reification. In 
section IV I formulate the conclusions and propose some suggestions on 
the role of a descriptive nosology of mental disorders.
 9 I mentioned the relation between expertise and concept individuation in Elisabetta 
Lalumera, On the explanatory value of the concept-conception distinction, “rivista Italiana di Filo-
sofia del Linguaggio”, 2013, pp. 73-81.
 10 Lara K. Kutschenko, In quest of ‘good’medical classification systems, “Medicine Studies”, 
III, 1, 2011, pp. 253-270.
 11 Thomas Insel et al., Research domain criteria (RDoC): toward a new classification frame-
work for research on mental disorders, “American Journal of Psychiatry”, CLXVII, 7, 2010, 
pp. 748-751.
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II
Psychiatrists as well as philosophers and historians of psychiatry con-
verge on the judgment that with the DSM-III12, there was a shift of para-
digm in the classification of mental disorders, from an explanatory stance, 
mostly informed by psychodynamic theory, to a descriptive one13. I shall 
briefly recapitulate the main features of the shift before assessing the pre-
sent debate, focusing on the a-theoretic and descriptive character of DSM 
from the 1980s on.
First, any reference to etiology and origin of disorders were expunged 
in the 1980 edition. As it was stated clearly in the introduction,
[t]he approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology or patho-
physiological process except for those disorders for which this is well established 
and therefore included in the definition of the disorder. Undoubt- edly, with time, 
some of the disorders of unknown etiology will be found to have specified biologi-
cal etiologies, others to have specific psychological causes and still others to result 
mainly from a particular interplay of psychological, social and biological factors14.
The manual categorized more than 300 different diagnostic categories 
– while its predecessor contained only 104 – with the ambition of cover-
ing all the mental disorders accepted by the US (and partially british) 
psychiatric community, regardless of their explanatory models and hy-
potheses15.
The a-theoretical character and, in particular, the elimination of all 
references to etiology was explicitly motivated by the aim of producing a 
neutral diagnostic instrument, to be used by clinicians of different orien-
tations:
 12 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-III: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiat-
ric Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, Washington 1980.
 13 Mitchell Wilson, DSM-III and the transformation of American psychiatry: a history, “Amer-
ican Journal of Psychiatry”, CL, 1993, pp. 399-410; Wilson M. Compton and Samuel b. Guze, 
The neo-Kraepelinian revolution in psychiatric diagnosis, “European archives of psychiatry and 
clinical neuroscience”, CCXLV, 4-5, 1995, pp. 196-201; K. W. M. Fulford and Norman Sartorius, 
The secret history of ICD and the hidden future of DSM, in Matthew broome and Lisa bortolotti 
(eds.), Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009, pp. 29-48; William C. Follette and Arthur C. Houts, Models of scientific progress 
and the role of theory in taxonomy development: A case study of the DSM, “Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology”, LXIV, 6, 1996, pp. 11-20.
 14 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-III: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiat-
ric Disorders, APA, Washington, 1980, p. 7.
 15 S. Demazeux and P. Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in perspective: Philosophical reflections on 
the psychiatric Babel, cit., p. XIV.
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The major justification for the generally atheoretical approach taken in DSM-
III with regard to etiology is that the inclusion of etiological variables would be 
an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical orientations, 
since it would not be possible to present all reasonable etiological theories for 
each disorder, (APA,1980, 7).
Sociologically speaking, the atheoretical approach also reflected the po-
litical tensions among the groups of professionals involved in the task-force 
of DSM, and more broadly in the treatment of mental disorders: medical 
doctors, clinical psychologists of different orientations, and social workers. 
Thus robert Spitzer, one of the key figures of the descriptive turn, and of 
the marginalization of psychodynamic accounts, explained that
[b]ecause no particular orientation or limited subgroup of schools has established 
its credentials as the sole scientific approach, there remains no scientific criterion 
for officially adopting one orientation over the others. Thus the field of psychiatry 
must somehow accommodate all the divergent schools and yet arrive at a single 
classified scheme that all agree to use. How then to reach agreement amid such 
unyielding disagreement? The authors of DMS-III sought to achieve this agree-
ment by separating psychiatric observation from psychiatric theory. The common 
classification scheme would consist of categories whose meanings could be de-
fined as far as possible through direct observation. In this way the adherents of 
different schools could nonetheless agree on basic terminology because disputes 
regarding definitions could be settled by appeal to what all could observe and 
could no reasonably deny. … Agreement over terminology requires, then, that the 
definitions of the terms remain operational and atheoretical16.
The situation of disagreement – obviously with different competing 
forces, due to the passing of time – is intact at present times, as the histo-
ry of the making of DSM-5 (from 2002 to 2013) clearly shows17. Now psy-
chiatrists of psychoanalytic orientation are no longer a major dissident 
voice, but patients’ interest groups, pressures from the pharmacological 
industries, and diverse scientific orientations within the American Psychi-
atric Association work-groups make the DSM-5 task force a “psychiatric 
babel”18.
To reach a level of possible agreement, explicit operational diagnostic 
criteria were introduced in DSM-III, linking the descriptions of symptoms 
 16 robert Spitzer, 1978, quoted in Luc Faucher, Evolutionary psychiatry and nosology: Pros-
pects and limitations, “baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication”, 
VII, 1, 2012, pp. 1-64.
 17 Joel Paris, The ideology behind DSM-5, in Joel Paris and James Philips, Making the DSM-
5, Springer, New York 2013, pp. 39-44.
 18 S. Demazeux and P. Singy (eds.), cit.
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(along with specifications about prognosis and treatment) to the abstract 
level of concepts of mental disorders, with the minimum possible use of 
terms with subjectively disputable meanings. Thus, for example, a charac-
terization such as the following, for Depressive Neurosis, was cancelled: 
“excessive reaction of depression due to an internal conflict or to an iden-
tifiable event such as the loss of a love object or cherished possession” for 
it contained the word “excessive”, which could give rise to obvious disa-
greements (would a three-month mourning be an excessive reaction? 
Would depression for the lost of one’s dog be excessive?)19. DSM-IV (and 
ICD-10) introduced evidence-based procedures for modifying the classifi-
cation, and several of them were modified, but the main features of the 
descriptive approach remain intact in the DSM-5.
Though many value terms are still present within the criteria, mostly 
conveying the harm, suffering and disability associated with mental disor-
ders, the latest version retains the explicit commitment to an objective 
and descriptive language for diagnostic criteria20. As for structure, charac-
terizations of specific disorders are ‘polythetic’: the whole set of criteria 
does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for diagnostic inclu-
sion, but thresholds are introduced for diagnosis judgments; for example, 
possession of any 5 out of 9 criteria qualifies a subject for a diagnosis of 
Major Depressive Disorder. Characterizations of specific disorders are al-
so ‘categorical’, rather than dimensional: they do not admit degrees of cat-
egory membership21. This style of diagnostic criteria reminds of a check-
list for diagnosis, where ideally the import of the personal opinion of the 
clinician is minimized.
 19 American Psychiatric Association Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics: Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 2nd edition, American Psychiatric Association, Wash-
ington; 1968, quoted by randolph Nesse and Dan J. Stein, Towards a genuinely medical model for 
psychiatric nosology, “bMC Medicine”, 2012, X, 1-9, p. 2.
 20 Harm (disadvantage or disability) to the person is one of the traits that qualify a condition 
as a mental disorder, according to the general definition as “harmful dysfunction” included in 
the Introduction of the 4th and 5th editions. See Jerome C. Wakefield, The concept of mental dis-
order: on the boundary between biological facts and social values, “American Psychologist”, 
XLVII, 3, 1992, pp. 373-380.
 21 There are many different ways to meet the requirements of a polythetic characterization, 
and it is possible that patients so diagnosed have no characteristics in common. This has advan-
tages (minimization of false negatives, i.e., unrecognized pathological conditions), but also short-
comings. For example, Galatzer-Levy and bryant found that there are 636,120 ways to meet the 
requirements for post-traumatic stress disorder as described in DSM-5. According to them, this 
proves that the characterization is not specific enough. See Isaac r. Galatzer-Levy and richard 
A. bryant, 636,120 ways to have posttraumatic stress disorder, “Perspectives on Psychological Sci-
ence”, VIII, 6, 2013, pp. 651-662.
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The main reason for adopting this kind of descriptivist stance in diag-
nostic criteria for specific disorders is well-known, and implicitly stated in 
the quote from robert Spitzer reported above: it is to enhance ‘reliabili-
ty’, the measure of the agreement of different clinicians on the same diag-
nosis (inter-rater reliability), or of the same clinician on the same diagno-
sis of sufficiently similar cases (intra-rater reliability). reliability in psychi-
atry was very low before the issue of DSM-III, and has greatly improved 
over the years22. Together with reliability, communication among different 
users of the manual was eased by means of a shared language. As Nesse 
and Stein explain23,
[o]perationalized diagnosis transformed psychiatry. It made possible standardized 
interviews epidemiologists could use to measure the prevalence of specific disor-
ders. Neurobiologists could search for pathology specific to reliably defined con-
ditions. Clinical researchers at multiple sites could collaborate on treatment stud-
ies that produced massive datasets, now summarized in treatment guidelines. 
regulatory agencies, insurance companies and funding agencies could, and soon 
did, require DSM diagnoses. Psychiatrists could finally diagnose and treat specific 
disorders, just like other physicians.
Nowadays, the DSM (and ICD) terminology and operational criteria 
set the standard for most psychiatric communications, thus achieving the 
initial goals24.
What about a-theoreticity? Why couldn’t reliability be achieved with 
theoretically informed nosology, including information about causes or un-
derlying mechanisms within the criteria – once that psychodynamic expla-
nations were (at least temporarily) discarded? In fact, many commentators 
agree on distinguishing between the atheoretical ‘style’ of the diagnostic 
criteria of specific disorders in the DSMs, and the committed theoretical 
‘general stance’ of the manuals and their authors, which is an endorsement 
of the biomedical model, broadly conceived: mental disorders are diseases 
conceived as discrete, existing entities, on a par with somatic ones, and 
consequently the diagnosed subject is a patient, in need of medical care25. 
 22 Darrel A. regier et al., DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada, Part II: test-re-
test reliability of selected categorical diagnoses, “American journal of psychiatry”, 2013.
 23 r. Nesse and D. J. Stein, Towards a genuinely medical model for psychiatric nosology, cit., 
p. 3.
 24 See Michael b. First, The National Institute of Mental Health, in Kenneth S. Kendler and 
Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry II: Nosology, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2012.
 25 See e.g. Massimiliano Aragona, Neopositivism and the DSM psychiatric classification. An 
epistemological history. Part 1: Theoretical comparison, “History of psychiatry”, XXIV, 2, 2013, 
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In this respect, the descriptive approach of DSM has been defined neo-
Kraepelinian, from the work of Emil Kraepelin in psychiatric nosology in 
the beginning of the XXth century. In an age where treatment and remis-
sion were very unlikely, Kraepelin focused his classification on an accurate 
description of symptoms and prognosis, believing that mental disorders 
could be classified by grouping together patients with sufficiently similar 
symptoms and prognosis, and by filtering out those symptoms that disap-
pear in the course of the disease. For example, he classified ‘dementia 
praecox’ (now schizophrenia) and manic-depressive disorder as two differ-
ent entities, on the basis of the fact that the one, but not the other, has a 
deteriorating course. However, symptoms and prognosis are not supposed 
to exhaust the nature of mental disorders, on Kraepelin’s view. He also 
maintained that the etiology of mental diseases was soon to be discovered, 
and psychiatry be aligned with the rest of medicine26.
Kraepelin’s conviction and medical model explicitly inform the ver-
sions of DSM from the third edition to the present27, together with ac-
knowledgment of the partial failure of the project of going beyond symp-
toms and prognosis for most mental disorders. As the introduction to 
DSM-IV text revision makes explicit, “the etiological basis for most psy-
chiatric conditions remains elusive…for this reason, a descriptive ap-
proach to classification has proved to be of greater utility”28. This, in the 
shortest form, is the ‘ignorance argument’ in favour of the DSM’s de-
scriptive approach. If the etiological basis ‘were’ known, they could pos-
sibly be included in the characterizations of specificic disorders. Given 
that they are not, descriptivism and atheoreticity within the criteria re-
main the best options, while the overall orientation is towards the medi-
cal model.
Notice that the latter premise of the argument, acknowledgment of ig-
norance, is documented in most scientific and survey articles, including 
pp. 166-179; J. Paris, The ideology behind DSM-5, cit. For a definition of the medical model in 
psychiatry see e.g. D. Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, cit.
 26 Emil Kraepelin, Textbook of psychiatry, translated by Anton r. Diefendorf, Macmillan, 
London 1907.
 27 The so-called Feighner criteria were the immmediate precursors DSM-III, and they were 
formulated partially on the basis of Kraepelin’s descriptions. See John P. Feighner et al., Diagnos-
tic criteria for use in psychiatric research, “Archives of general psychiatry”, XXVI, 1, 1972, pp. 57-
63. For an opinionated history see roger blashfield, The classification of psychopathology: Neo-
Kraepelinian and quantitative approaches, Springer Science & business Media, New York, 2012.
 28 First, Michael b. et al., Introduction, in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders: Fourth Edition, Text Revision, American Psychiatric Association Arlington, VA, 2000, 
p. XIV.
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those who defend a theoretical over a descriptive approach to nosology29. 
It is, of course, ‘relative’ ignorance: while research projects are going on, 
no hypothesis has reached the standard of a diagnostic criterion that can 
be employed with the widest consensus in a variety of clinical and admin-
istrative settings. On this point, the statement of David Kupfer, the head 
of the DSM-5 task force, is clear:
[t]he problem that we’ve had in dealing with the data that we’ve had over the 
five to 10 years since we began the revision process of DSM-5 is a failure of our 
neuroscience and biology to give us the level of diagnostic criteria, a level of sensi-
tivity and specificity that we would be able to introduce into the diagnostic 
manual30.
To sum up, in this section I presented the descriptive stance of DSM 
editions from the third to the present as motivated by disagreement 
among different orientations, and aimed at achieving reliability; I also 
claimed that atheoreticity is in fact the endorsement of the medical model 
of mental disorders, together with an ignorance argument for the conclu-
sion that it is premature to include etiological information within the di-
agnostic criteria. With a view to reliability, and with an unfinished agenda 
of finding out biomarkers and mechanisms, characterizing disorders via 
symptoms and course appears to be the best option for large-use diagnos-
tic manual.
III
In this section I shall introduce the concept-conception distinction, 
taken from the philosophical debates on concepts; then I shall show how 
it can be employed to respond to what I take to be the main objections to 
DSM’s descriptivism (distance from the medical model, the problem of 
reification, and inadequate validation).
In the philosophical tradition – as different from the psychological and 
cognitive tradition – a concept is the general representation of some kind 
of object, property or event, that can be shared and grasped by different 
 29 research on schizophrenia (the dopamine hypothesis, the gene hypothesis and the brain 
hypothesis among others) is an example. See e.g. Matcheri S. Keshavan, Henry A. Nasrallah and 
rajiv Tandon, Schizophrenia, Just the Facts, 6. Moving ahead with the schizophrenia concept: from 
the elephant to the mouse, “Schizophrenia research”, CXXVII, 1, 2011, pp. 3-13. 
 30 Interviewed by the New York Times. See Pamela belluck and bernard Carey, Psychiatry’s 
guide is out of touch with science, experts say, “New York Times”, VI, 2013.
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individuals31. The concept of justice, for example, is a general representa-
tion of what justice is, and it is applied correctly to all and only the in-
stances of justice (actions, decisions, and thoughts). Philosophers strive to 
find a proper characterization of the concept of justice, typically by test-
ing definitions. Some concepts are more apt to be characterized as defini-
tions, like the concept of a prime number (a natural number that has ex-
actly two natural divisors, 1 and itself), or the concept of gold (the sub-
stance with atomic number 79). Others are less so, like aesthetic and val-
ue concepts (beautiful, good, true), but also everyday concepts such as ar-
tifacts may prove hard to define, and are better characterized by non-defi-
nitional criteria, or prototypes (e.g. chair, door). In the case of natural 
kind concepts (concepts of uniformities existing in nature, which support 
robust inductions), some philosophers have proposed that they have a 
theory-like structure; what fixes the extension of a natural kind category 
is what the best theory (or God’s eye view) will eventually be able to dis-
cover. In the meantime, what we employ in order to identify members of a 
natural-kind category and discriminate them from members of other cate-
gories are our ‘conceptions’, that is, categorization procedures, often 
rough-and-ready, sometimes just partial points of view on the nature of 
the category. Here is how the philosopher of language ruth G. Millikan 
explains the notion:
[c]all the sum of the various ways that you have of recognizing a thing or, what 
amounts to the same, of recognizing when you are receiving information about a 
thing, your “conception” of that thing. Your conceptions of most common things 
have many components, for you have many ways of recognizing these things – no 
infallible ways, of course, but many fairly reliable ways. Whatever you know 
about a thing is part of your conception of it too, for whatever you know might 
help you to identify it, or help prevent you from misidentifying it, under some cir-
cumstances32.
A concept stands to conceptions as one to many. So, for example, the 
moral philosopher John rawls thinks that different societies have differ-
ent conceptions of justice:
 31 A collection of philosophical essays on the nature of concepts from Plato to the present, 
with an useful introductory chapter, is Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, Concepts: core read-
ings, Cambridge Massachussetts, Mit Press 1999. For an early formulation of the concept-con-
ception distinction within the contemporary debate, see Georges rey, Concepts and conceptions: 
A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips, “Cognition”, XIX, 3, 1985, pp. 297-303.
 32 ruth Garrett Millikan, Language: A biological model, Oxford University Press on De-
mand, Oxford 2005.
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Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered […], for what is just and 
unjust is usually in dispute. Men disagree about which principles should define 
the basic terms of their association. Yet we may still say, despite this disagree-
ment, that they each have a conception of justice. That is, they understand the 
need for, and they are prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for as-
signing basic rights and duties and for determining what they take to be the prop-
er distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Thus it seems 
natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions 
of justice […]33.
Also, conceptions may gradually approximate a concept, as higher lev-
els of expertise are reached. For example, I may say that logicians individ-
uate and spell out the criteria of the concept of conjunction, and my own 
conception of conjunction changed with time, gradually approximating it 
when I attended a logic class. Likewise – the example is due to the philos-
opher of language and mind Christopher Peacocke – Gottfried Leibniz 
and Karl Weierstrass both had conceptions of the limit of a function, and 
approximated the definition34. A particularly interesting case for the con-
cerns of this paper is concepts of natural kinds (to pick one current char-
acterization among others, uniformities in nature that support inductions 
in virtue of their intrinsic properties). While science investigates the na-
ture of natural kinds, so to determine their extension precisely, in most 
contexts they are identified with conceptions. Consider, for example, the 
concept of gold. We identify gold with criteria such as brilliance, colour, 
presence in the environment, and typical association with objects and 
forms. These conceptions are all fallible, as they do not discriminate gold 
from fake gold; nevertheless, they make gold easily recognizable in cases 
where chemical tests would be practically impossible, and epistemically 
redundant.
Finally, conceptions do not determine a category’s extension, but con-
cepts do. In most cases we don’t rely on the opinion that our identifying 
procedures are all what there is to a thing’s nature, as we implicitly as-
sume that (in most cases) natures are hidden from view, they eschew phe-
nomenological traits. The intuition is that of a difference between meta-
physics and epistemology for a category:
[w]e need to distinguish the concept of something from merely the (epistemic) 
conceptions of it […] Concepts are what remain stable across variability in con-
 33 J. rawls, A Theory of Justice, cit., p. 5.
 34 Christopher Peacocke, Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality, “Philosophical 
issues”, IX, 1998, pp. 43-88.
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ceptions, and so give argument a point, framing the questions of what people 
could learn and what might be the limits of reason and thought35.
The concept-conception distinction can now help me elucidate the role 
that descriptive characterization of mental disorders in the DSM may 
have. The DSM contains conceptions of specific disorders, aimed at facili-
tating communication and enabling clinicians to issue diagnostic judg-
ments reliably, but also reasonably quickly and considering that no tests 
for the “hidden nature” of disorders are currently available. A DSM’s en-
try, writes Paul McHugh,
[b]eing appearance driven, it is similar to a naturalist’s field guide with the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such. Just as roger Tory Peterson’s A Field Guide 
to the Birds distinguishes a prothonotory from a yellow or blue-winged warbler 
by the bird’s coloring, voice, and range, the DSM distinguishes and then arrang-
es mental disorders by their appearance – on their shared phenomenological 
features36.
Just like a bird’s field guide help the readers identify the species of 
birds present in a certain area from how they look, sound, and behave, a 
criterial characterization of a mental disorder would help clinicians of di-
verse orientations to diagnose from phenomenological features. A Field 
Guide contains conceptions, as concepts of bird species are illustrated in 
textbook of ornithology, and explained with reference to their physiology 
and genetic structure; just like DSM contains conceptions, to be complet-
ed with proper concepts specified elsewhere.
The example of the Field Guide helps us to introduce the first common 
objection to the descriptive approach of DSM, namely, its distance from 
the current medical model. As the objection goes, descriptive characteri-
zations of mental disorders are akin to Thomas Sydenham’s bedside ob-
servations in the XVII century, but now, as Cuthbert and Insel claim,
[i]n other areas of medicine, trends have increasingly moved in the direction of 
ever more precise specification of the genetic, molecular and cellular aspects of 
disease. In specialty after specialty, there has been a realization that disease enti-
ties that appear to be a single disorder actually have distinct genetic precursors 
and pathophysiology. For instance, for many forms of cancer, diagnosis is no 
longer defined by the involved organ or even the pathologist’ s report, but rath-
er by analysis of genetic variants that can predict exactly what treatment will be 
 35 G. rey, Concepts versus conceptions (again), cit., p. 222.
 36 Paul r. McHugh, Striving for coherence: psychiatry’s efforts over classification, “Jama”, 
CCXCIII, 20, 2005, pp. 2526-2528.
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optimal […]. In another domain, perhaps the most striking example of this trend 
involves a new drug, Ivacaftor (Kalydeco), approved by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration after an expedited review. The drug is effective in treating patients 
with cystic fibrosis who have a form of the syndrome with a specific mutation of 
the cystic fibrosis transmembrane regulator gene. Only 4% of patients with cystic 
fibrosis have this genetic mutation, but, for these patients, the compound is high-
ly effective in correcting the action of the malfunctioning protein37.
There are two lines of reply to this objection. First, there is the Igno-
rance argument, illustrated in the previous section. Even granting that 
neuroscience, genetics and epigenetics, provide now many hypotheses 
about the etiology of mental disorders or of some of their symptoms, it is 
plausible that, quoting Kupfer again, in most cases, they have not reached 
“a level of sensitivity and specificity that we would be able to introduce 
into the diagnostic manual”38. In fact, the test for genetic variants of can-
cer and the discovery that a subgroup of patients with fibrosis can be 
treated with Ivacaftor mentioned above exemplify a kind of success that 
psychiatry experienced only at the beginning of the XXth century, with 
syphilis. As Derek bolton summarizes:
[v]ery diverse signs and symptoms at and over time were unified into a syndrome 
caused by a kind of bacterium, a spirochete, invading the central nervous system, 
and which was treatable by penicillin. This early game, set and match achieve-
ment of the biomedical model applied to psychiatry has not been repeated since, 
and there are, as is well-known, ample reasons from research in the half-past cen-
tury to cast doubt on whether it will ever be repeated, and indeed reason to be-
lieve that it will be not. As professor Kendler put it in a recent paper on the phil-
osophical framework for psychiatry: no more spirochete-like discoveries, but 
rather multiple causes at multiple levels39.
Here is a second rejoinder to the claim that descriptive conceptions are 
remote from the medical model. The concept-conception distinction 
makes it possible to suggest that there is no tension in keeping descriptive 
conceptions of mental disorders for diagnostic, and specifying elsewhere 
(in research texts and optionally in different classifications) the genetic, 
 37 b.N. Cuthbert and T.r. Insel, Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: the seven pillars 
of RDoC, cit., p. 1. See also D. Murphy, Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, cit., chapter 6.
 38 See footnote 30 above.
 39 Derek bolton, Classification and causal mechanisms: a deflationary approach to the classifi-
cation problem, in Kenneth S. Kendler and Joseph Parnas (eds.), Philosophical issues in psychiatry 
II: Nosology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 6-10. bolton mentions Kenneth S. Kendler, 
Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry, “American Journal of Psychiatry”, CLXII, 3, 
2005, pp. 433-440.
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neuropathological or most likely multilevel factors that intervene to cause 
them, that is, specifying elsewhere the concept of the disorder. Similarly, 
there is no tension in having both a Field Guide book for birds, and a sci-
ence of ornithology. On this view, a descriptive approach to classification 
could be harmonized with the medical model insofar as it is completed by 
explanatory tools, in which mechanisms and ethiology of disorders at var-
ious levels of complexity are elucidated.
Moreover, there is a line of thought that brings to the conclusion that 
whereas descriptive conceptions of symptoms and prognosis may be con-
tingent to many diseases, they are not so for psychiatric disorders, and 
therefore psychiatric diagnosis will inevitably rely on descriptive concep-
tions. In this sense, it is claimed, psychiatric disorders differ from other 
diseases in the relation between signs and symptoms that they instantiate. 
I borrow again Derek bolton’s phrases:
[i]n acute medical care the symptoms of distress (physical or mental) is likely 
not to be the critical point, and may indeed in trauma be a good sign (of con-
sciousness and life), the critical point being more likely to be an inner, be-
neath the skin, sign of something potentially catastrophic. In psychiatry, by 
contrast, especially in distress-related conditions such as depression and anxi-
ety, the symptoms of distress are more constitutive of the illness, and the op-
posed concept of sign has a much less critical role. To put the point another 
way, the mental phenomenology, and its immediate behavioural associations, 
and its interpretation in the social context, have a defining role in our con-
cepts of mental illness, and it is likely that, whatever else we may want our di-
agnostic categories to capture, we want them to capture these phenomena40.
Let us now consider the second objection to the descriptive approach of 
DSM, namely is that its concepts lack validity; in particular, from a histor-
ical point of view, some commentators have argued that, from DSM-III 
on, validity has been sacrificed to reliability41. While there are different 
specific definitions in the literature, a common core to them is the idea 
that validity concerns whether a proposed concept captures or not an ex-
isting category in the world (in the sense that phlogiston or ghosts are not 
valid scientific concepts). A list of criteria of validity for psychiatric con-
cepts was introduced before the publication of DSM-III, and now com-
prises validators from neuroscience, genetics, and the biomedical sciences 
(symptoms and course, family aggregation, genetic variations, and pathol-
 40 D. bolton, Classification and causal mechanisms: a deflationary approach to the classifica-
tion problem, cit., p. 10.
 41 See e.g. S.E. Hyman, Can neuroscience be integrated into the DSM-V?, cit.
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ogy of neural mechanisms)42. There is a consistent agreement among psy-
chiatrists and philosophers of psychiatry on the claim that a few of the dis-
orders catalogued in DSM-5 correspond to validated categories. To quote 
Nesse and Stein’s synthetic statement, “with the exception of neurological 
disorders such as Huntington’s Disease, not one of the main DSM mental 
disorders can be validated by laboratoryor imaging biomarkers”43.
My point is that the objection is not directed to descriptivism per se. 
Descriptivism is the choice of a particular structure and terminology for 
conceptions of mental disorders (polythetic criteria and objective lan-
guage); it is not a thesis about which mental disorders should be includ-
ed in the manual. In short, descriptivism is about “how”, not what to 
characterize in the diagnostic manual. Validity, on the contrary, con-
cerns the “what” question. Thus, in principle, there is no obstacle to the 
view that new research may provide amendments to the present classifi-
cation, without changing its descriptive style. This is in fact what hap-
pened in the revision process of DSM-IV that lead to DSM-5. This is 
what Kendler and First call a “iterative” model for psychiatric progress:
[t]he iterative model assumes that using increasingly rigorous empirical methods, 
each subsequent revision of our diagnostic system will produce improvements 
over its predecessor. Overtime, this process will slowly move our nosology from 
the rough constructs we now call ‘disorders’ towards a better and better approxi-
mation of the ‘true’ psychiatric diseases as they exist in nature. The iterative mod-
el is evolutionary and cumulative in nature. The architects of DSM–III–r8 and 
DSM–IV implicitly utilised this approach. The DSM–IV revision strategy, which 
called for making changes only if there was sufficient evidence to justify such a 
change, also implicitly followed this iterative model44.
There are some examples of possible problems arising within the cur-
rent nosology, which could be addressed by enhancing empirical valida-
tion studies without dismissing the descriptive approach: to name just 
two, the division between affective and schizotypal disorders45, and the 
 42 Eli robins, and Samuel b. Guze. “Establishment of diagnostic validity in psychiatric ill-
ness: its application to schizophrenia.” American Journal of Psychiatry 126.7, 1970, pp. 983-987, 
Kenneth S. Kendler, “The nosologic validity of paranoia (simple delusional disorder): a review”, 
Archives of General Psychiatry 37-6, 1980, pp. 699-706.
 43 r. Nesse and D. J. Stein, Towards a genuinely medical model for psychiatric nosology, 
cit., p. 4.
 44 Kenneth S. Kendler and Michael b. First, Alternative futures for the DSM revision process: 
iteration v. paradigm shift, “The british Journal of Psychiatry”, CXCVII, 4, 2010, pp. 263-265.
 45 See eg. Talya Greene, “The Kraepelinian dichotomy: the twin pillars crumbling?”, History 
of Psychiatry 18-3, 2007, pp. 361-379, and 
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proper characterization of personality disorders46. As the authors of the 
paper just quoted claim, the main advantage of iteration is that it is user-
friendly, namely, that it is not revisionary with respect to diagnostic and 
communication practices of clinicians and other subjects involved, mini-
mizing disruption.
However, there is more to the objection of validity of existing no-
sological concepts, namely, the claim that they hinder psychiatric pro-
gress qua being descriptive47. There are two ways of considering the de-
scriptive characterization of a mental disorder as those included in the 
DSM: either the criteria are evidence for the presence of the disorder, or 
they are definitional with respect to it48. Suppose that it is found that 
two (very) different causal pathways lead to the same syndrome de-
scribed in a DSM entry – say, for the sake of simplicity, a genetic cause, 
and a traumatic cause. On the evidential views of criteria, that would 
suffice for concluding that the descriptive criteria underdetermined the 
presence of a disorder, where in fact there are two or many different dis-
orders. On the definitional view, the disorder is one, as the criteria are 
reified into an entity.
The rigid reification of disease entities out of criteria is arguably prob-
lematic for research. In article published in 1996 William Follette and Ar-
thur Houts discuss the case of depression, and the result of a long empiri-
cal study testing a certain treatment on depressed patients, which showed 
no significant improvement of condition. They claim that the result was 
due to the inadequate reification of the criteria for depression into one 
disorder entity, where in fact there should be many:
[a] syndromal classification system assumes that a depressive is a depressive is a 
depressive. However, there are several well-developed accounts for how depres-
sion might come about, (e.g., biological, behavioral, cognitive-behavioral, and in-
terpersonal theories, etc.). If one assumed that depressive symptoms were one 
possible endpoint from a number of etiological pathways and that any group of 
persons with depression contained a number from each pathway, then compara-
tive outcome studies are forever doomed to get equivalent results because those 
 46 See the history of the discussion before the publication of DSM-5 contained in Peter 
Zachar et al., “Personality disorder in DSM-5: an oral history”, Psychological medicine 46-01, 
2016, pp. 1-10.
 47 See e.g. S. E. Hyman, The diagnosis of mental disorders: the problem of reification, cit.; 
b. N. Cuthbert and T. r Insel, Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: the seven pillars of 
RDoC, cit.
 48 Well-explained in Paul E. Meehl, Bootstraps taxometrics: Solving the classification problem 
in psychopathology, “American Psychologist, L, 4, 1995, pp. 266-275
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who might have had a biological cause might respond to medication but not 
those who were interpersonally unskilled, and so on49.
The case of depression is problematic and its proper discussion in em-
pirical terms is out of the scope of this paper. However, the lesson to be 
learned is clear enough: that descriptive criteria, once reified, are an ob-
stacle to research.
A possible defense of the descriptive approach goes through employ-
ing once more the distinction between conceptions, which are not defini-
tional, versus concepts, which fix their referents. As we do not use our 
conception of gold (the yellow-looking, brilliant substance) for selecting 
gold samples for chemical studies, so the descriptive conceptions of disor-
ders included in the DSM are better employed for diagnosis and commu-
nication, with the proviso that they do not exhaust the nature of the dis-
ease itself. On this reading, the problem of reification is not descriptivism 
per se, but one possible (and empirically disadvantageous) kind of de-
scriptivism, namely the use of criteria as reference-fixing, and the confla-
tion of conceptions with concepts, in a strict operationist epistemology. In 
Meehl’s words, psychiatry should import from the rest of medicine the 
notion that syndromes are just evidence:
advanced-science medical model does not identify disease taxa with the opera-
tionally defined syndrome; the syndrome is taken as evidentiary, not as definitory. 
The explicit definition of a disease entity in nonpsychiatric medicine is a conjunc-
tion of pathology and etiology and therefore applies to patients who are asympto-
matic (which is why, e.g., one can have a silent brain tumor or a staghorn kidney 
that never causes trouble during life and is only found postmortem)50.
IV
At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the 
standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a 
certain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. I have 
revised the main reasons for introducing descriptivism in DSM-III, name-
 49 William C. Follette and Arthur C. Houts, Models of scientific progress and the role of theo-
ry in taxonomy development: A case study of the DSM, “Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psy-
chology”, LXIV, 6, 1996, pp. 1120- 1132.
 50 P. Meehl, Bootstraps taxometrics: Solving the classification problem in psychopathology, cit., 
p. 266.
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ly the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and improving communica-
tion in a situation of theoretical disagreement, which has continued up to 
now, with different contenders. Descriptivism is also motivated by the Ig-
norance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative fail-
ure of finding genetic, epigenetic, and neuropathologic biomarkers for 
most mental disorders up to now. Descriptivism has also the advantage of 
capturing the phenomenology of mental disorders, which appears to be 
essential for the diagnosis (but not exhaustive of the nature of the dis-
ease). My point has been to show that if we rely on the distinction be-
tween conceptions – procedures of identification – and concepts – refer-
ence-fixing representations – we may understand a limited but valid role 
for descriptive characterizations, and reply to common objections ad-
dressed by those who advocate a theoretically informed approach.
A defense of descriptivism within DSM makes room for the idea that 
different classification systems may serve different purpose within the 
same scientific domain. As Kenneth Kendler writes,
[n]osologies have to serve at least two masters (not counting the administrative 
and insurance apparatus of health care) – researchers and clinicians. These needs 
are sometimes in conflict. researchers want detailed, highly accurate diagnoses 
and typically ask more than fewer questions. Clinicians are always in a hurry and 
so for them the shorter and simpler the diagnostic criteria the better51.
Should researchers build and rely on a different nosology, as that envis-
aged in the rdoC project, or should a more thorough empirical work on 
the existing provisional categories provide a way of complementing exist-
ing criteria outside the diagnostic manual, is a question to be left open in 
the present contribution52.
 51 Kenneth S. Kendler, Introduction, in K. S. Kendler and J. Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Is-
sues in Psychiatry II: Nosology, cit., p. XIII.
 52 The very first version of this paper was presented in bologna, Department of Philosophy 
and Communication, at a workshop on Aspects of scientific explanation organized by Francesco 
bianchini on October 21st, 2015. I thank the organizers and audience for comments. I also thank 
Vera Tripodi and Maria Cristina Amoretti for discussions on these themes in a Philosophy of Me-
dicine workshop held in Turin, Philosophy Department, on January 22nd, 2016.

